Last year I wrote a blog post for the TB CRE covering a story about Ravindra Patil who died of tuberculosis after having spent time in Mumbai Central Prison. The piece inspired me to read more about the spread and control of tuberculosis in prisons. Though not comprehensive, the following is a list of links to articles about tuberculosis in prisons. This list does not necessarily represent the places where we find the highest rates of TB among inmates. However, the list does indicate places where it has been possible for researchers to gather data. Of the 22 countries identified by the World Health Organisation as having a high-burden of tuberculosis, intriguingly not all (such as Mozambique, Myanmar and mainland China) have accessible data on TB in prisons. Kudos to those countries who allow research into tuberculosis to be conducted in their prisons. Only through obtaining the proper data can we hope to improve the condition of people infected with a survivable and curable disease.
Culture Matters is pleased to announce that Assoc. Prof. Chris Lyttleton’s new book, Intimate Economies of Development: Mobility, Sexuality and Health in Asia, has been launched by Routledge Press. The book explores the intimate dimensions of migration and development in Southeast Asia, including their impact on individuals’ health: “Aspirations, desires, opportunism and exploitation are seldom considered as fundamental elements of donor-driven development as it impacts on the lives of people in poor countries. Yet, alongside structural interventions, emotional or affective engagements are central to processes of social change and the making of selves for those caught up in development’s slipstream.”
The book has been well received by a wide variety of readers. Professor Pál Nyiri of Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, calls Intimate Economies of Development, a ‘highly original and sometimes heartrending book’ in which ‘Lyttleton reconsiders the ways development projects and the global market are changing people’s lives in remote corners of Southeast Asia through the lens of intimacy and desire.’ Instead of considering sex and affect as epiphenomenal to development, ‘Lyttleton places them at the centre, showing that intimate entanglements between strangers are crucial to understanding how contemporary globalisation actually works, not just in “global cities” but also along rural byways.’
Professor Peter Aggleton of the University of New South Wales writes that the book is ‘a real wakeup call demonstrating the energy, enthusiasm and creativity of poor people in Southeast Asia searching for a better life.’ Professor Peggy Levitt of Wellesley College and Harvard University argues that Lyttleton’s ‘intensive, long-term fieldwork in places as diverse as rubber plantations and massage parlors located throughout the Greater Mekong’ offers a view of an ‘emotional’ economy of development with ‘rich theoretical insights and innovative methodological models for understanding the production and consumption of “progress.”’
This innovative approach to the relationship between intimate lives and large-scale development doesn’t simply offer a new theoretical lens, according to Prof. Yos Santasombat of Chiang Mai University: ‘The path-breaking connections between material and affective aspects of development allow us to probe deeper than is customary to understand the “side effects” of development and clearly explain why many good projects failed miserably’.
For those of us who have been watching Chris’ work from the sidelines, the publication of Intimate Economies of Development is a great chance to see up close how anthropology helps us to understand macrosocial processes on a human scale. The publisher is offering a discount for those wishing to purchase the book for a limited time. Just download the flyer linked at the bottom of this news story if you’re interested. And congratulations to Chris on a landmark publication.
For more information: go to the Taylor and Francis Group website.
For book flyer, link here (pdf). Flyer Intimate Economies of Development
Science and Nature have just published research that supports a hypothesis about Neanderthal-human hybridisation that I published with Professor Roger Valentine Short in 2011. The recent popularity of the hybridisation theory was also reported in Nature news, Fox News, and National Public Radio.
I was first inspired to think deeply about patterns of interbreeding between Neanderthals and humans while teaching Human Evolution and Diversity at Macquarie University in 2010. I approached Roger Short from Melbourne University with some of my ideas and we ended up writing a paper together. Famous for his work on elephants, Roger has also worked on hybridising camels and lamas. His work on Haldane’s law was a crucial part to building our Neanderthal-human hybridisation hypothesis.
Africans do not have Neanderthal ancestry. Interbreeding between Neanderthals and humans occurred as some groups migrated outside Africa between 80,000 years and 50,000 years ago. Looking at experimental studies of nuclear DNA and mitochondrial DNA from both humans and Neanderthals, Roger Short and I have hypothesised that Neanderthal men mated successfully with female humans but not vice-versa. Turning to Haldane’s law, we conjectured that the offspring were predominantly female hybrids. Male hybrids were uncommon, absent or sterile. Beyond the evidence from nuclear and mitochondrial DNA, this hypothesis also gels well with data from the Y chromosome that indicates that the human Y chromosomes came entirely from Africa. The recent experimental work published in Science and Nature bolsters our excitement in the hybridisation hypothesis. Great-Great-Great Grandma, as it turns out, was likely the hybrid offspring of a Neanderthal male and a female human.
In science, the method of naming hybrid offspring usually follows the rule that the first half of the name comes from the male parent and the second half comes from the female parent. For example, a liger is the offspring of a male lion and a female tiger, a cama is the offspring of a male camel and a female llama, and a zorse is the offspring of a male zebra and a female horse. Given this conventional naming practice for hybrids, should humans living outside of Africa actually call themselves NEANDUMANS? What do you think?
Here’s an interesting list of allegedly predatory journals, but even more interesting is the troll of comments below the list. While I tend to agree with those who talk in favour of open-access forums, I would, when searching for a journal to publish my article, check this list and of course do some careful research on the journals that attract my attention.
Originally posted on Scholarly Open Access:
By Jeffrey Beall
Released January 2, 2014
The gold (author pays) open-access model has given rise to a great many new online publishers. Many of these publishers are corrupt and exist only to make money off the author processing charges that are billed to authors upon acceptance of their scientific manuscripts.
There are two lists below. The first includes questionable, scholarly open-access publishers. Each of these publishers has a portfolio that ranges from just a few to hundreds of individual journal titles.
The second list includes individual journals that do not publish under the platform of any publisher — they are essentially standalone, questionable journals.
In both cases, we recommend that researchers, scientists, and academics avoid doing business with these publishers and journals. Scholars should avoid sending article submissions to them, serving on their editorial boards, reviewing papers for them, or advertising in them. Also, tenure and promotion committees should…
View original 4,020 more words
The Islamic New Year has already begun. Around the globe, Shiites are observing ceremonies to commemorate the martyrdom of the prophet’s grandson Hussein in the battle of Karbala. These ceremonies are central to Shiite identity globally. The rich variety of these traditions worldwide provides a window into the diversity of Islamic religious expression.
Last year, I travelled to Hyderabad, India, to observe local ceremonies during Muharram, the first month of the Islamic lunar calendar. I had previously documented Muharram ceremonies in Indonesia in 2009 and I was inspired to see what present-day Muharram ceremonies looked like in India. The ceremonies in Indonesia originated in India. Sepoy Indians under the command of the British in the nineteenth century transported the ceremonies throughout Southeast Asia. The ceremonies proved popular throughout the Indo-Malayan archipelago, but believing that the ceremonies had connections to Mohammadean secret societies and Chinese Triads, British colonial powers sought to extinguish the event. Muharram public rituals survived only in two locations, Pariaman and Bengkulu along the Western coast of Sumatra, but only because Sumatra was handed over to the Dutch in 1824. In other locations Muharram ceremonies might have continued but they changed to become unrecognisable from their Indian origins. In Pariaman and Bengkulu, Sunnis and Shiite Indian descendants have continued contemporary interpretations of Muharram ceremonies that have come to include diverse performing arts and symbolic processions.
Breaking news: Women can now drive in Saudi Arabia without going to jail! (But they risk getting a ticket.)
Saudi artist Saffaa just alerted me to a critical news item that the English-language media is not covering at all: women in Saudi Arabia can now drive without going to jail. The only penalty the Saudi government will now impose on women caught driving is to issue them a ticket for not having a license.
As Saffaa put it,
So women can now drive in Saudi without going to jail. Why isn’t Western media all over this news? Are they sleeping or this news isn’t as sensational as women going to jail for driving? Ah and yes no one had to burn a bra. Not a single one …
The news item in Arabic is here, reporting that the Kingdom’s Traffic Authority Director (I’m not exactly sure how to translate “mudeer `aam al-muroor“) General Abdulrahman Muqabbel has clarified to Sabq (the news agency reporting this) that women caught driving will only be ticketed for a traffic infraction (mukhalifa murooriyya faqat). Previously women caught driving were taken to the local police station where they were held until their male guardians came to pick them up.
Here’s a YouTube video taken by a woman in Jeddah driving and encouraging other Saudi women to get in their cars and drive. She says, “Right now, I’m on Malak Street, and I’m driving, and there’s nothing, nobody is stopping me, nobody is cursing me, nobody is photographing me, I’m just taking this video to say to girls, Let’s go, darlings, out to drive… but you must have a [male] guardian in the car with you! Ours is behind me [the camera shifts to the back seat and a male voice says, "yeah"]…”
There are multiple similar videos now going up on YouTube of women driving and urging their compatriots to do the same, and many more Saudi women who are not taking videos but who are out driving, exploring the new boundaries around Saudi women’s use of public space.
Tricycle has a preview of a new documentary film on Jodo Shinshu Buddhism in America. Looks like it will be a very interesting film.
In 1898, a group of young Japanese immigrants founded the religious association “Soko Bukkyo Seinen-kai” (Trans. “San Francisco Buddhist Youth Association”). Responding to their request, the Nishi Hongwanji Temple in Kyoto, Japan, headquarters of the Jodo Shinshu Hongwanji-ha school of Buddhism, began to dispatch Japanese priests known as Kaikyoshi to the USA the next year. In the years that followed, a national organization called the Buddhist Mission of North America (BMNA) would take shape, eventually growing to become one of the largest Buddhist organizations in the United States with over 60 temples nationwide.
It seems that Australia’s Coalition politician Joe Hockey has an intellectual brother in the Republican Party!
Historian Zach Schrag (who has published a groundbreaking book on the history of ethics review, Ethical Imperialism) just told me about an American politician who is encouraging his constituents to search through National Science Foundation grants and highlight ones that they believe are a waste of tax dollars. Republican Majority Leader Eric Cantor promises that with his YouCut Project, “Together, we will identify wasteful spending that should be cut.”
What’s more, Cantor helpfully suggests several keywords that you might use to search through the NSF database for “wasteful” research, including:
- social norms
And, of course
I’m not even kidding.
Last week, during the final throes of election campaigning, Tony Abbott and the Coalition attacked four Australian Research Council (ARC)-funded research projects as “futile” and “wasteful,” and promised that such research would not be funded under a Coalition government. My project on sexuality in Islamic interpretations of reproductive health technologies in Egypt was singled out for particular ridicule.
In so doing, the Coalition inadvertently highlighted the absurdity of having politicians judge the merits of academic research.
My ARC-funded research project that the Coalition has criticised looks at how medical authorities and religious authorities in Egypt interact to influence Muslims’ opinions about reproductive health technologies. I’m looking at 3 technologies, specifically: emergency contraception (a.k.a. the morning after pill), erectile dysfunction drugs (e.g. Viagra), and hymenoplasty (hymen reconstruction surgery, usually undertaken to make a woman appear to be a virgin when she marries). These are somewhat controversial topics in Egypt because they’re connected with sexuality.
Now, new reproductive health technologies tend to elicit debate in society because they trigger existential questions: about when life begins, about what right humans have to meddle in natural human processes, about women’s sexuality and gender roles, and about the relationship between religion and medicine. IVF and cloning are good examples of this.
These case studies boil down to a fundamental question: to what extent do religious leaders affect what the average lay Muslim does and thinks about sexuality and reproductive health? If, for example, a religious authority says that hymenoplasty is permissible or not permissible, do people listen? Do they care?
My preliminary research suggests that no, they don’t — at least, not when it comes to hymenoplasty. Most lay Muslims I have spoke with either don’t know or don’t care what their religious authorities say about hymenoplasty.
In Egypt, three leading Muslim clerics have issued controversial fatwas on hymenoplasty. Thomas Eich describes these in his article “A tiny membrane defending ‘us’ against ‘them’.” The first was former Dean of the Women’s Islamic Law (shari`a) Faculty at al-Azhar University, Su`ad Salih, who ruled in February 2007 that hymenoplasty should be allowed not only for survivors of rape (which religious authorities had already approved), but also for women who had had sexual intercourse consensually and then ‘repented their mistake.’ Controversy ensued, along with attacks on Salih’s authority and ability to interpret Islamic law.
In short, we have three leading Egyptian clerics saying that hymenoplasty is permissible under Islamic law. And yet when I conducted on-the-ground research in Egypt in 2012-2013, almost every single lay Muslim that I interviewed claimed that hymenoplasty was both religiously forbidden and a sin!
In other words, Egyptian Muslims tend to only follow fatwas that accord with what they already believe about religion.
by Veronica Escalante, who is doing the Master of Applied Anthropology and just returned from fieldwork in Ambon where she focused on children’s narratives about the religious other.
Over the last decade, Moluccans have given fuel to their age-old reputation for being rough and inclined to bellicosity, due to a protracted regional conflict between Christians and Muslims since 1999. This reputation has a long history but has emerged with new force throughout Indonesia since the conflict. Also people in the region employ this stereotype to explain the violent clashes in this out-of-the-way province of the nation. In contrast, traditions of siblinghood such as pela and current local efforts at reconciliation challenge the stereotype. While aggressive behaviours and attitudes can often be observed in the region, acts of kindness and support are just as visible. A representation of this dualism in the behaviours and attitudes of Moluccans is the sago palm, which has a hard trunk covered by spines on the outside and a soft white inside, from which people make a starch that is the base for sago porridge (papeda), a traditional staple.
The waitress came over and saw the four-month-old baby lying in her mother’s arms, smiled and bent over to kiss him on the forehead. The mother welcomed the gesture and started chatting about how she had been. The waitress only knew the mother from the coffee shop, but by looking at them interacting you would have thought they were family or at least very close friends. This type of interaction between people is not uncommon in Ambon. The anthropologist Bartels (1977), among others, has described mechanisms of support that occur in the region. The most well known is the communal practice of pela. This tradition comprises alliances between villages that are sealed by drinking each other’s blood, and through which the villages swear to protect and support one another. Such practices established a sense of community that was further strengthened by handing down historical narratives of siblinghood within Maluku and by songs such as the popular song titled Gandong (‘brotherhood’).
While these practices have attracted considerable interest from academics (Huwaë 1995; Sholeh 2013), little has been said about the new stereotypes of Moluccan character that have emerged since 1999 conflict. Because of the riots and people’s attempts at reconciliation, Moluccans acquired at least two new narratives about their character: the first is of being a bellicose and conflict driven people; the second tells about a strengthened identity of kinship. While both narratives existed before the conflict, they have been partly reaffirmed and, at the same time, taken on slightly new meanings. Both descriptions of Moluccans can be related to the behaviour of people in the region as well as to their attitudes towards conflict and reconciliation. These behaviours have lead to the idea that there is a contradiction or dualism of Moluccan character. Jack Manuputty, a pastor and peace activist in Ambon calls this the dualism of Moluccan character. It is similar to the binary relation between land and sea, anger and joy. Stanley Ferdinandus, founder of the local NGO Heka Leka (www.hekaleka.org) refers to sago trees as being a key symbol of this dualism.
Moluccan character in daily behaviour
Narratives of Moluccan identity as violent are apparent in everyday occurrences. In a recent research trip to Ambon it did not take me long to learn about the reputation people from the Moluccas have in Indonesia, and even between themselves, as being untameable people. An informant whose family served in the Dutch colonial army described that this notion was already common even before the Dutch colonised the territory. She described how her grandparents told her that people from the Moluccas were actually recruited by the Dutch to serve in the military and work as security because of their belligerent nature. Similar ideas are still common in Indonesia. For example, an informant from Sulawesi who moved to Ambon when she was 18 years old described to me how she did not want to live there because of this reputation of the Moluccans. She thought that Moluccan men were stubborn, aggressive, and rough. To many outsiders this stereotype is easily confirmed by the way that Moluccans talk and move. They tend to be loud and make relatively excessive arm movements. As a newcomer one may see such gestures as expressing anger and next wonder why people would be so upset. On the streets, almost without exception drivers of vehicles continually honk their horns, and ignore transit lanes and traffic lights. However, when getting to know people they appear to be very warm, hospitable, emphatic, and kind.
Mutual support and empathy in Ambon go way beyond common courtesies. For example, while I was there, everyday someone would accompany me to where I wanted to go and help me with translations while not accepting any financial compensation I offered. Moreover, people would often invite me to eat and sleep in their houses. They even went out of their way to take my husband fishing while I was doing research. On a daytrip with some friends from Ambon to Saparua Island we encountered a couple of tourists from France. My Ambonese friends invited them to stay in their house on the island free of charge, showed them around all of the twelve villages there, and even organized activities in and around Ambon during the following days. These kinds of courtesies are not only offered to foreigners but are part of everyday actions between Moluccans. For example, in the urban neighbourhood of Galunggung the Holle family hosts free English classes for all kids in the neighbourhood twice a week. During Ramadan they even invite lots of children to break the fasting in their home.
The Sago Palm
The apparent dualism in the character of Moluccans can be symbolised by the sago palm. The sago palm has spines from stem up to the outer branches. Looking at the tree you would not dare to come near it, much less touch it. However when you cut the tree and split the trunk you will find that it is very soft inside. The inside is filled with starch that is used for making sago porridge, a popular staple in the region. With the recent conflict came a narrative of Moluccan identity that may be represented by the sago trees. The conflict began in 1999 and was officially ended in 2003 but violent clashes and bombings still occurred until 2011. The conflict generated a common perception of Moluccans of being prone to conflict. Even though scholars have examined the multiple political and economic reasons for the conflict (Von Benda-Beckmann. 2007: 284; Bertrand, 2001: 58-88), as well as the external interventions that maintained the conflict (Stern 2003: 63-84), the conflict generated clear divisions between Christians and Muslims and new visions of these communities (Turner 2003: 258).
People from the two religions now live completely segregated and there is a constant fear that the conflict may resurface not so much because of religious differences but because of the belligerent character of Moluccans. For example, the notion that Moluccans are a fierce people is also very popular among youth. While asking young child soldiers involved in the 2011 violence about the reasons of their involvement, Jacky Manuputty, a local pastor and peace builder, was told: “You had your turn to fight, now it is ours”. However, conflict also made it necessary to strengthen the idea of brotherhood and the meaning of kinship for forging a sense of community. The dream of peace and return to traditional practices of pela and gandong began to flourish during and after the conflict. However, pela and gandong took on new meaning as alliances between the two religions (Bartels 2003: 14). The intention of achieving a Moluccan brotherhood after the conflict can even be discerned in the musical productions of youth. They created songs referring to unity in identity, such as Satu Darah, meaning ‘One Blood’.
The aim of achieving unity is not exclusive to ethic Moluccans but expands to embrace people who are not ethnically Moluccan to avoid the ethnic discourse that was present in the beginning of the conflict in 1999. One example of the efforts to include non-ethnic Moluccans is in the adaptation of pela to soa as described to me by the Baileo Maluku Network. While pela only applies to people who are ethnically Moluccan, the village of Paso generated a similar alliance called soa with people who were not ethnically Moluccan. Similarly, efforts to bridge the now segregated Muslim and Christian groups also demonstrate the importance of siblinghood in Moluccan identity. For example, the organization Heka Leka that facilitates various activities to unite people from both religions recently joined seven groups of children both Christian and Muslims to celebrate Ramadan. The Centre for Interreligious Dialogue is doing similar efforts with teachers, government officials and youth. These efforts include overnight stays at each other’s houses, giving experiences of siblinghood a whole new meaning.
The contradiction of a reputation of violence and brotherhood as the main attributes of the people from Maluku is present in conflict and attempts for peace. Just as a sago tree, when observing recent actions of Moluccan people, on the outside all we see is the conflict, but deeper probing reveals the vulnerability of a people who dream of brotherhood.
The culture of Moluccans is neither violent nor peaceful; it does not reflect conflict or brotherhood – it is both. Moluccan behaviour resembles the sago palm, which can harm and injure, while the glue found inside the trunk can unite people of all ethnic groups and religions. The narratives that define Moluccan identity have changed since the conflict of 1999. Not only have they contradicted the belief of Gandong being at the centre of their behaviours, giving way to a discourse of bellicose Moluccans; but they have also generated the possibility of the emergence of a discourse of Moluccans as peace builders and brothers. Their recent history has reshaped the way in which they are seen and understood, generating a new horizon of possibilities of actions of violence and kinship.
Bartels, D. (1977) Guarding the Invisible Mountain: Intervillage Alliances, Religious Syncretism and Ethnic Identity among Ambonese Christians and Moslems in the Moluccas. Ithaca: Cornell University
Bartels, D. (2003) ‘Your God is No Longer Mine: Moslem-Christian Fratricide in the Central Moluccas (Indonesia) After a Half-Millennium of Tolerant Co-Existence and Ethnic Unity’, in: A State of Emergency: Violence, Society and the State in Eastern Indonesia. Sandra Pannell, ed., pp. 128-153. Darwin: Northern Territory University Press
Turner, K (2003), ‘Myths and Moral Authority in Maluku: The Case of Ambon’, Asian Ethnicity, 4, 2, p. 241, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost, viewed 26 July 2013.
Von Benda-Beckmann, F. and von Benda-Beckmann, K. (2007) Social security between past and future: Ambonese networks of care and support, Berlin: Lit Verlag.
Bertrand, J. (2001) ‘Legacies of the Authoritarian Past: religious Violence in Indonesia’s Moluccan Islands’, Pacific Affairs. Ontario: University of Toronto, pp. 57-85
Stern J. (2003) ‘Demographics’ in: Why religious militants kill: Terror in the Name of God, New York : Ecco, pp. 63-84
Huwaë, S. (1995) ‘Divided Opinions About Adatpela: A Study Of Pela’, Cakalele, Vol. 6 (1995), Pp. 77–92
Sholeh, B. (2013) ‘The Dynamics of Muslim and Christian Relations in Ambon, Ea Indonesia’, International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 4 No. 3; March 2013